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APPELLANTS BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants appeal from an order granting respondents 
partial summary judgment holding as a matter of law respondent 
was a covered merit system employee. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Judge of the Third 
Judicial District Court, held that as a matter of law plaintiff-
respondent, a court reporter, was a covered merit system employee 
and granted a partial summary judgment. The court further ordere 
that damages be resolved at later proceedings. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek the reversal and vacating of the lower 
courts order and that the case be remanded to the lower court 
with the directive that the respondent was not a merit employee 
and not subject to the merit system. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent was employed as a court reporter by the State 
of Utah. For several years she worked for Judge Merrill C. Faux 
and was Judge Faux's reporter when he retired December 31, 1972. 
Respondent remained employed during January 1973 as Judge Faux 
was asked to sit during that month. 
Judge D. Frank Wilkins, Court administrator, notified 
respondent in writing that as of February 1st, 1973, she would be 
terminated because there were no positions for court reporters 
open in the District Court. 
Respondent requested a merit system council hearing on her 
termination on January 30, 1973. This request was denied by the 
merit system council since court reporters had not been certified 
to participate in the Merit System. 
This action was then commenced. 
2 
: I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT COURT 
REPORTERS ARE MERIT EMPLOYEES BECAUSE OF 
SPECIFIC STATUTORY LANGUAGE TO THE CONTRARY. 
Court reporters of the entire Judicial System of the State 
of Utah — Supreme Court, District Courts, and Juvenile Courts — 
have been specifically placed beyond and outside the scope and 
meaning of the Merit System as enacted and amended. Because of 
this specificity, the lower court erred in holding otherwise. 
Utah Code Annotated 67-13-6 is a crucial and controlling 
statute relative to those positions, individuals or agencies 
exempted from merit system status. In particular, Section 6 (a) 
(4) exempts the following: 
11
 ....those employees whose regular duties 
include public advocacy and defense of 
administration policy; and those in a per-
sonal and confidential relationship to 
elected officials and to heads of departments 
agencies and other major offices...." 
(emphasis added) 
Referring to the above statutory language, clerks and 
reporters of the court, whether it be the Supreme Court or 
District Court have personal and confidential relationships with 
the judges for whom they work.. This perhaps is better shown by 
legislative mandate in Utah Code Annotated 78-56-1.1 where is 
found: 
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"The court administrator shall appoint a 
certified shorthand reporter with the ap-
proval of the district judge to report the 
proceedings in each division of the district 
courts. The certified shorthand reporters 
shall hold office during the pleasure of the 
court administrator, and the district judge." 
(emphasis added.) 
The legislature here acknowledges that the relationships 
between the court and reporters are of such a personal nature, 
that not only must there be compatability, but the Court must 
have control over its own business and personnel. Otherwise, 
the Judicial System no longer becomes one of independence under 
the Utah constitution, but one controlled by the legislature 
telling the courts who they may and may not hire and/or dismiss 
thus prohibiting the courts to function as is required by law. 
Some ambiguity exists relative to Utah Code Annotated 
67-13-S(g) where referrance is made to "employees of the judiciary 
who are not exempt by the provisions of this section" as being 
covered by the merit system. This state of confusion dissipates 
when it is seen that the deletion of the former paragraph (a)(8) / 
was not a legislative mandate that all personnel of the judiciary, ' 
Supreme Court and otherwise, are included under the merit system. 
No one would argue that the District judges are covered by 
the merit system. They are elected officials serving under the 
specific exemptions of Utah Code Annotated 67-13-6 (a) (1) and (2). 
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None-the-less, subparagraph (4) as previously quoted specifically 
exempts those in a "personal and confidential relationship to 
elected officials" from coverage of the merit program. 
What could be more personal and confidential than a court 
reporter assigned to be the reporter for a certain Judge. The 
reporter is not "the" reporter for "the courtroom", for if the 
Judge changes courtrooms, the courtreporter changes with him to 
the new location. The reporter is the reporter of the judge, not 
the State's reporter, and under Utah Code Annotated 78-56-1.1 as 
previously quoted, the Judge has control over the dismissal of 
his reporter. Further it sould be pointed out that many situations 
take place in front of the court reporter, but in chambers, because 
of the sensitive nature of the matters involved, the judge can 
request certain portions of transcript to be presented to him by 
the reporter without either party aware. Because of this relation-
ship, it becomes imperative to permit the broad discretion of the 
Judge to control the stiuation before him. Nothing could con-
stitute a more confidential or personal relationship as required 
by subparagraph (a)(4). 
Colorado has had similar experiences as Utah in the "Civil 
Service" form of government, even though Utah's system is re-
latively new. Colorado's Constitution, Article XII, Section 13, 
paragraph (3) makes it possible if deemed advantageous for 
Judicial Officers and employees to become a part of the Civil 
Service or Merit System. It states: 
"Officers and employees within the 
judicial department, other than judges 
and justices, may be included within the 
personnel system of the state upon deter-
mination by the suprerre court, sitting en 
banc, that such would be in the best 
interests of the state.11 
The above provision was interpreted by the Colorado Supreme 
Court in Inre Interrogatory of Governor, 162 Colo. 188, 475 P.2d 
31 (1967) in responding to an inquiry of interpretation as per-
mitted by the Colorado Constitution. The pertinent language of 
the court is as follows: 
"Our opinion is that the foregoing 
interrogatory should be answered in the 
negative. In other words, it is our 
view that employees of courts of record 
of the State of Colorado and the posi-
tions they occupy, as authorized by 
statute, are not subject to the Civil 
Service provisions of Articel XII, 
section 13 of the Constitution of 
Colorado. 
At the outset, it should be noted that 
the issue posed by the interrogatory is 
not whether employees of courts of re-
cord should be under a merit system, as 
opposed to the so-called spoils system. 
Rather, the more precise issue is 
whether such employees should be brought 
under a merit system which is in turn 




It is our considered view that the con-
struction and interpretation given Article 
XII, section 13 of the Constitution of 
Colorado by all three branches of our state 
government has consistently been that the 
aforementioned provision in our Constitu-
tion does not apply to, or in any manner 
encompass, employees of courts of record. 
And this interpretation by the several 
branches of state government has not only 
been both contemporaneous and long stand-
ing in nature, but squares with the separa-
tion of powers doctrine. Let us first ex-
amine the judicial interpretation hereto-
fore given this particular section of the 
Constitution." 
Thus we find our neighbor state recognizing the problems 
posed in the case at bar. U.C.A. 67-13-6 (a) (4), however speci-
fically permits the "personal and confidential11 status to be 
exempt. Because of the permissible posture of the Constitution, 
Colorado established by voice of the court the finding as spelled 
out in Utah Law. The mere fact that language specifically nam-
ing judicial employees as exemptjwas deleted does not carte 
blanche prove that judicial court reporters are under the merit 
system. U.C.A. 67-13-6 (a) (4) argues strongly against that 
position. 
In further supporting this position, it must be observed 
that there is no clear and unequivocal declaration of legislative 
intent that 78-56-1.1 is repealed or done away by the implementa-
tion of the 1971 amendment to the merit act. ^ Thi^jCode section 
specifically provides that the Judge may dismiss the court re-
porter without question^because the reporter serves at the pleasure 
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or whim of the Judge, and therefore prevails over the less 
specific and ambiguous provision of the 1971 amendment. 
In re Utah Savings and Loan Association 21 Utah 2d 169, 
442 P.2d 929 (1968) clarifies this issue. There the Utah 
Supreme Court said: 
"It is true here, as it is in so many 
areas of the law, that one statute has 
been enacted at one time with a particular 
purpose in mind, and that another has been 
enacted at another time with a different 
purpose in mind. When this has been done 
and there is an apparent conflict, it is 
not proper to put all the emphasis to one 
statute, as though it stated all of the 
law on the subject to the exclusion of the 
other. They should be looked at together, 
in their relationship to each other, with 
a view to reconciling any such apparent 
conflict and giving each its intended 
effect insofar as that can be accomplished 
without nulifying the other.11 
The Court further cited an early Utah case, University of 
of Utah v. Richards 20 Utah 457, 59 p. 96 (1899) which says: 
"One act is not to be allowed to defea't 
another, if by reasonable construction the 
two can be made to stand together." 
These holdings of the above cases come parallel to the 
present matter and as previously stated dismiss the confusion 
as to which statute prevails. U.C.A. 78-56-1.1 was enacted in 
1969 to protect the integrity of the Judicial System. This 
statute protected the confidential nature of judicial matters. 
The 1971 Amendment to the merit act was of a wholly 
different nature. It was not enacted for the specific purpose 
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of increasing and protecting the integrity of the Judicial System 
but was a part of a general bill-aimed at increasi.n^ Jthe. scope 
of the merit coverage. The conflict therefore arises by two 
wholly unrelated matters having been enacted, one a specific 
statute, the other a general statute. Thus, the decision of 
In re Utah Savings and Loan Association, supra, must control. 
The court said it is "not proper to put all emphasis to one 
statute /U.C.A. 67-13-6(gV/, as though it stated all the law on 
the subject to the exclusion of the other /u.C.A. 78-56-1.17" k *^ 
" Jr 
(brackets added). Looking at them together to give each its / 
intended affect without nullifying the other is what must be done. 
U.C.A. 78-56-1.1 permits the Judge specifically to dismiss 
reporters—to take them off the payroll. The effect to be main-
tained is therefore clear. Does U.C.A. 67-13-6 permit this 
statute to maintain its identity?, Yes! Section 6(a)(4) permits 
those positions of a relationship to elected officials /Jtfdgejs7 
to be exempt from the merit act in spite of subsection 6 (g) . 
Thus, U.C.A. 78-56-1.1 has maintained its identy and force. 
Does U.C.A. 78-56-1.1 permit U.C.A. 67-13-6 to maintain its 
identity and purpose? Yes! This latter statute is a general 
statute enacted by the legislature to expand the strength of the 
merit system. Subsection (g) of that subsection specifically 
defers its position to employees who are not "exempt by the 
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provisions of this section..." As has been shown, the specific 
statute, U.C.A. 78-56-1.1 controls and maintains its identity 
and therefore becomes the exception spoken of under subsection 
(g) . Thus, the Suprene Courtis decision to reconcile and allow 
each to maintain its identity has been accomplished and the 
Judges are allowed to hire and dismiss court reporters as desir-
ed—the reporters, therefore, are not under the merit law. 
Some question could arise, however, that the statute later 
in time prevails-even over a specific statute. Appellants feel 
this position has no strength in the present matter. Pacific 
Intermountain Express v. State Tax Commission 7 Utah 2d 15, 316 
P.2d 549 (1957) presents to the reader both general rules re-
lative to the above position, but as stated in Bateman v. Board 
of Examiners of the State of Utah 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381 
(1958): 
"Generally speaking we do not disagree 
with this rule, nor with the reasoning upon 
which it is based. But like all general 
rules it must be applied with discernment as 
to whether it fits the fact situation at 
hand and no rule should be given force in 
application where the facts plainly negative 
any such intent." 
In 1966 this court reaffirmed that position in Howe v. 
Jackson 18 Utah 2d 269, 421 P.2d 159(1966) that both statutes 
must be considered in light of their background and purpose in 
deciding how to rule. The exact language of the court is as 
follows: 
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"Therefore, when such problems arise 
a statute should be considered in the 
light of its background and purpose; 
and also in connection with other aspects 
of the law which have a bearing on the 
problem, in order that its intent and 
purpose be fulfilled." 
The background and purposes have been clearly set forth. 
And what is the intent of U.C.A. 78-56-1.1? It is to allow judges 
of all state courts, not just the district courts, to control 
their staff and reporters in fulfillment of their constitutional 
duties under Article VIII of the Utah Constitution. Such cannot 
be done if the court judges do not have the discretion of re-
leasing from employment those individuals not found to meet with 
the approval of the judges of the court. 
It is therefore seen that (1) court reporters are specific-
ally exempted from merit by virtue of U.C.A. 67-13-6 (a) (4) and 
that U.C.A. 78-56-1.1 as a specific an unrepealed statute, allows 
dismissal of court reporters which is in full harmony with the 
provisions of the merit bill. 
II 
THE LOWER COURT FURTHER ERRED IN ITS RULING IF 
COURT REPORTERS ARE COVERED, BECUASE THE RE-
SPONDENT WAS NOT CERTIFIED AT THE TIME OF 
DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE. 
If the Supreme Court fails to accept appellantfs first 
agrument regarding the exemption of court reporters under the 
merit act, the fact still remains and is uncontroverted that the 
respondent was not certified nor was she on probation as required 
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by the merit law. 
As defined by Utah Code Annotated 67-13-6 (e): "The term 
•Merit System1 shall refer to positions under schedules B and C." 
What are those schedules? U.C.A. 67-13-6 (b) (2 and 3) says as 
follows: 
"Schedule B - The competive schedule, 
consisting of all positions filled through 
competitive examination, written or un-
written and to which tenure shall apply 
following a probationary period, subject 
to the availability of funds and continued 
need for the position. 
Schedule C - The noncompetitive schedule, 
consisting of all positions for which it is 
not feasible to administer competitive ex-
aminations at entry. Following satisfactory 
completion of at least a one year probationary 
period, employees under this schedule shall 
receive tenure." 
Under either schedule B or C, before an employee may receive 
what is termed "tenure," a probationary period must be undertaken 
and completed by the employee in question. Then certification, 
i.e. merit status, can be gained. Therefore, under the above 
the respondent cannot claim that prior service gave her tenure in 
position when the merit system went into effect. In fact, the 
statutes above provide exactly the opposite. Utah Code Annotated 
67-13-7 (a) specifically sets forth the requirements of certifica-
tion for those employed when the act went into effect before 
merit status is given. That Section states: 
12 
"All employees, officers and other 
personnel not other wise exempt by law, 
who prior to the effective date of this 
act have served continuously for a period 
of one year or more, and either who have 
been certified under existing merit system 
rules and regulations or who are certified 
in writing ninety days after the effect 
date of this act by the appointing officer 
under whom they serve to be serving satis-
factorily, shall be deemed to have tenure 
under the merit system..." (Emphasis Added) 
Based on the preceeding language, it is seen that provision 
was made for employees in respondent's situation - those who had 
been serving in their capacity for one year prior to the effective 
date of the act. However, U.C.A. 67-13-7 (a) spells out specific 
procedures necessary for persons such as respondent in order to 
take advantage of coverage. Those procedures are (1). The 
employee must be certified under the existing rules and regulations 
and (2). said certification is established by the appointing 
officer certifying in writing within 90 days that the employee is 
serving satisfactorily. In the case at bar none of the procedures 
was followed or even attempted. It is therefore difficult for 
appellant to comprehend now the lower court held that the re-
spondent was on merit as a "matter of law1.1 Everything points to 
the contrary conclusion that as a "matter of law" the employee 
was not under the merit system because none of the required pro-
cedures was followed or even attempted. 
If U.C.A. 67-13-7 (a) had been utilized within 90 days as 
there required, tenure would be given - not requiring a probation 
13 
period, for those state employees covered by the act. Since it 
is the States contention that court reporters do not fall under 
the scope of the act, these arguments tend to be academic at 
the most. Nevertheless if certification, as required by the 
statute had not been completed in time, then any employee covered 
by the act would have to look to schedules B and C to see how 
tenure could be achieved. Those schedules specifically call for 
a probationary period. The Oregon Supreme Court reiterated the 
widely held position regarding the status of probationary employees-
in Schlieting v. Bergstrom 13 Or. App. 562, 511 P.2d 846 (1973). 
The court said: 
"We conclude that the better approach 
is for courts to not review whether the 
hiring or firing of a probationary public 
employe is "arbitrary. ,f Except for the 
substantive constitutional limitations 
discussed elsewhere, a public employer 
can base personnel dicisions concerning 
probationary employees on any reason or 
no reason. In short, personnel decisions 
concerning public employees are within 
the unfettered discretion of their employers." 
Therefore, in keeping with above position, even if the 
respondent had been on probation, her dismissal would have been 
proper. 
The merrit system regulations further point out the sound-
ness of this position and the fallibility of the lower court's 
ruling. Article VII, Section 5, paragraph 1 of the merit system 
and personnel regulations dated December 1, 1973 (still in effect) 
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says as follows: 
"All employees, officers and other 
personnel not otherwise exempted by law, 
who prior to May 11, 1965, or prior to 
the date their agency or their position 
comes under Merit System coverage and 
who have not been certified under the 
previously existing Merit System may be 
discharged; or if they are certified in 
writing by the administrative officer 
to be serving satisfactorily on the 
effective date of such coverage shall 
have status as: 
a. Probationary employees in the class 
of position in which they are serving 
until they have completed a satisfactory 
one-year probationary period from the 
date of original appointment. Nothing 
herein contained shall preclude positions 
held by any incumbent from being reclassi-
fied or reallocated or preclude the establish-
ment of additional classes or the division, 
combination, alteration or abolition of exist-
ing classes, pursuant to this act and 
appropriate regulations.11 
Further, paragraph 3 of the same makes provision for new 
agencies or positions coming under the merit act after the act 
goes into effect. Thus, if this court finds that the 1971 amend-
ment places court reporters under merit coverage, this paragraph 
must also control to determine to whom and when merit status 
attaches. It reads as follows: 
"When a position within a covered agency 
is brought under the Merit System subsequent 
• to the date the agency came under Merit 
System coverage, the incumbent, in order to 
be eligible for continued employment in such 
position, shall on the effective date of such 
coverage meet the requirements in Paragraph 1 
and 2 of this section in the same manner as 
if his agency were being brought under the 
Merit System on such date." 
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Certainly, if this court held that court reporters fall 
under the merit system, they would be controlled by the language 
"brought under the Merit System" subsequent to the effective date 
of the Act, and would therefore dictate that procedures be follow 
ed for certification which were not in the case at bar. 
Paragraph 2 states: 
"Persons with one year or more of service •; 
who are not certified in Paragraph 1 above 
as serving satisfactorily on the date of 
such coverage may: 
a. Be separated; or 
b. Be placed on probation for a six-month 
period commencing with the effective date of 
such Merit System coverage, with the rights 
of probationary employees; or 
c. Be given provisional status pending the 
establishment of an adequate register for 
their respective positions." 
Here, it is clearly seen from the regulations that (1) 
certification is a must, (2) the procedures must be followed 
and not by-passed, (3) probation is necessary if the employee 
was not covered when the act went into effect and (4) certain 
sanctions are spelled out when there is non-compliance. None 
of the above has been complied with in the present matter except 
the dismissal provision. This court must not allow such a 
flagrant violation of merit procedures to stand as presented by 
the respondent. To do so, would in effect nullify the entire 
procedures of merit law and set a bad precident. 
16 
Not only the above cited regulations permit discharge for 
non compliance and/or during the probationary period, but Utah 
Code Annotated 67-13-7 (b) and (c) likewise permit such action: 
"(b) Persons with one year or more of 
service, not so certified may (1) be separ-
ated; or (2) be placed on probation for a 
six-month period commencing with the ef-
fective date of this act with the rights of 
probationary employees; or (3) be given 
provisional status pending the establish-
ment of an adequate register for their 
respective positions. 
(c) An employee who has had less than 
one year of service on the effective date 
of this act may be discharged; but if re-
tained, shall be required to satisfactorily 
complete a probationary period of one year 
from the date of his appointment in order 
to be retained in state service." 
Thus once again certification is requisite to merit status, 
for if one is "not so certified" he may be "separated," from that 
position and merit status totally or "placed on probation." The 
respondent was separated and dismissed in this matter as permitted 
above. 
In essence, the laws and regulations state that until one 
is certified and until one follows the procedures of the merit 
system—even over extended periods-—one is not a merit employee. 
The respondent's situation here as to certification is very 
similar to that of an Assistant Attorney General. Under the 
Attorney General Career Service Act 67-5-6 et. seq. an attorney 
may be placed in career service status six months after he is re-
commended for career status by the Attorney General. If the 
17 
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Attorney General doesn't make recommendation, the attorney is 
not placed in career service status. The status is not con-
ferred automatically, the Attorney General must specifically 
recommend such status and upon this certification merit status 
is bestowed. 
It is therefore clear upon this closer analysis of the 
laws involved, that even if court reporters fall under a non-
exempt status, the respondent failed to comply with the laws 
and regulations and cannot be considered as "amatter of law" 
to have been "on merit." 
CONCLUSION 
It has been shown that court reporters do not fall under 
merit system because of their relationship with the Judicial 
system and that even if they did, the laws and regulations were 
not followed to give the respondent merit status. 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted to this court that 
the decision of the lower court be reversed and remanded for 
further action in compliance with its opinion. 
Respectfully, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY, 
Attorney General 
Frank V. Nelson 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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